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Virtually our entire existence became medicalized in the spring of 2020. How we worked, 
shopped, washed, loved had suddenly been transformed into actions with a profound impact 
on our own health as well as the health of our nations, essentially into matters of life and death. 
Medicalization is obviously not a new phenomenon; many of the activities just mentioned have 
been subject to medical expertise and language. Yet the intensity and scope of the 
medicalization we are experiencing now is novel – at least in terms of recent history. Most of 
us had not experienced what it is like to have our public and private lives framed in terms of 
medicine. In some ways, now we share what was already the reality of many chronically ill 
people.  
This medicalized reality unavoidably has profound ramifications for our politics. While 
the political implications of expanding medical power have been considered before, 
contemporary political theorists have not been among the leading voices in these debates.1 
Despite the influence Michel Foucault – the preeminent theorist of medical power – political 
theorists have generally paid little heed to the medical, while they have, at least since the Great 
Recession, been increasingly focused on the economic. 
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Today, the political power of medicine is not only in full view, but it is battling the 
economic for predominance – a conflict which Foucault, who saw medicalization and 
production as complementary, would not not have expected.2 In some instances, the economic 
frame has been pitted directly against the medical, perhaps most dramatically in the public 
confrontations between President Donald Trump and Dr Anthony Fauci, the Director of the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Trump has of course not been the lone 
champion of the economic. As early as March 2020, economists, industry leaders, and 
politicians from across the world have joined the efforts to reassert the supremacy of the 
economic frame, efforts which have only intensified since then. The medical frame and its 
champions have largely been holding their own, though they have lost some battles.  
But even if the economic frame comes out on top, as seems likely, many aspects our 
current medicalized existence could persist for months, perhaps even years, with significant 
consequences for how we think and act politically. Political theorists therefore need to reengage 
with medicalization. 
Before we begin to explore the political consequences of the medicalization we are now 
seeing, however, I should clarify what I mean by medicalization. One useful definition 
describes it as a ‘process by which medical definitions and practices are applied to behaviors, 
psychological phenomena, and somatic experiences not previously within the conceptual or 
therapeutic scope of medicine’.3 Through medicalization, phenomena become entangled in a 
web of medical concepts, technologies, professions, institutions, and regulations. But the 
degree of entanglement can vary, which is to say that medicalization is not necessarily an all 
or nothing matter. Take handwashing. We knew before the outbreak that not washing our hands 
was unhygienic, but probably thought of this lapse as a bit gross rather than medically 
dangerous. That has clearly changed. How we wash our hands has become a matter of explicit 
and active governance by medical experts. We have been bombarded with advertisements 
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about the medically correct procedure, duration and importance of handwashing, and we are 
now likely to think that failing to wash our hands exposes us and others to a radically greater 
medical risk than before. So, while ‘Not washing hands’ is still not a symptom of Covid-19, it 
has become medicalized to a significant degree. It important to note that medicalization does 
not imply over-medicalization, that is, it is not necessarily bad. The medicalization of 
handwashing has few obvious downsides, while its upsides are huge, like limiting the spread 
of the coronavirus and future infections. Yet, the example of handwashing, which we are now 
impelled to do as often as we can, wherever we are, also illustrates that, whether good or bad, 
the consequences of medicalization can reach far beyond the clinic. This essay sketches out the 
political consequences of the medicalization that the coronavirus has unleashed, drawing on 
examples from the UK and the US. I do so by focusing on four themes: political discourse, 
political change, political emotions, and democratic citizenship.  
 
Medicalization and political discourse 
The pandemic has crowded out many other of topics of conversation this year. However, it has 
also influenced the way we talk – and write – about other matters, including, notably, political 
issues. Since the outbreak began, there has been what seems like an explosion of politically 
applied medical metaphors in the media. One Washington Post op-ed, for example, warned 
about the dangerous “contagion” of “conservative irrationality,” while The New Yorker called 
out what it terms “the preëxisting condition in the Oval Office.”4 Incidentally, these pieces both 
imply that there is a simple, apolitical, medical approach to the crisis, which the Trump 
administration has ignored – an implication I shall return to later. In both the US and the UK, 
political commentators discovered ‘pandemics’, ‘contagions’, and ‘viruses’ of all kinds, 
including but not limited to mental illness, fear, and courage. Meanwhile, in speculating about 
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what will come after the crisis, they have spoken about ‘cures’ or ‘treatments’ for inequality, 
poverty, and neoliberalism.  
What should we make of this apparent medicalization of political discourse? It is worth 
noting that political theorists are no strangers to medical metaphors. Plato famously used the 
authority of the physician over medical issues as a template for the authority of the statesman 
over matters of government.5 While this model might resonate with those who see the role of 
politicians as solving problems that citizens may or may not know they have, it also lends itself 
to interpretations of Plato as an antipolitical thinker. Hannah Arendt, for instance, saw Plato as 
the progenitor of a tradition of political theory that aims to understand how people can be ruled 
well – in contrast to a ‘political’ political theory that aims to understand how people can rule 
themselves well.6 The metaphor of the physician serves Plato’s ostensive objective, by clearly 
distinguishing the rulers – who have the knowledge and means to do what is best for everyone 
– from the ruled – who do not and are reduced to patients. The proliferation of medical 
metaphors delineating issues beyond the understanding of ordinary people may have similar 
implications. Those who complain about the declining authority of experts would perhaps 
celebrate this development.7 On the other hand, the increasing reliance upon medical metaphors 
might signal or contribute to depoliticization. This is what political and social theorists have 
argued about the proliferation of economic concepts and metaphors – such as ‘enterprise’ and 
‘entrepreneurialism’ – in politics, taking it as evidence of the neoliberalization of society.8 If 
we take this vernacular as evidence of a particular kind of social order, why not read the 
proliferation of medical metaphors in the same way?  
However, it is easy to overestimate the political effects of medical metaphors (or 
economic ones for that matter). Medical language, especially psychiatric concepts, can be and 
has been used to delegitimize and disempower individuals by throwing their competence and 
reliability into doubt.9 Often when we call someone or something sick or crazy, we neither 
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intend nor are taken to suggest that the person or situation we are describing requires medical 
expertise. If I tell a friend that work is crazy, they would not take me to say that I am suggesting 
that my workplace is showing symptoms of a mental disorder or that a psychiatrist needs to 
come in get things in order. Similarly, when people now speak of a pandemic of one issue or 
another, they probably do not mean to say that we should approach these issues using the same 
expertise and tools we are using to address the Covid-19 crisis, though there are exceptions. 
So, we should be careful not to overinterpret the proliferation of medical metaphors as 
evidence of a sudden or imminent colonization of the political by the medical, something which 
some critics of medicalization have been guilty of – paralleling the tendency among some 
critics of neoliberalization to overinterpret economic metaphors in everyday life as signifying 
the supremacy of neoliberalism and the loss of non-economic forms of thought. Still, following 
the lead of neoliberalism’s more cautious critics, the increasing use of medical metaphors could 
be interpreted as a sign that medical expertise and ways of thinking are on a rapid political 
ascendance.  
The medicalization of political discourse during the pandemic may also compound with 
related trends such as poverty, policing, and racism. There have been growing calls in recent 
years to approach a variety of social issues – especially issues that primarily affect marginalized 
and deprived communities – as ‘public health issues’. For instance, some Black Lives Matter 
activists have argued that defunding the police is a public health issue, partly because people 
with health problems are disproportionately criminalized and partly because of the health 
impact of police violence. This approach, they observe,  has been endorsed by health experts, 
including the American Public Health Association.10 Activists hoping to replace a 
criminalization framework with a public health one believe this will result in effective change, 
whether that be in terms of changing how the individuals affected by these issues are perceived 
and treated or changing the means and urgency with which policy makers deal with the issues. 
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But it may also have unintended effects. For one, if the problems of a deprived community are 
transformed into issues of medical governance, its members are at risk of being transformed 
into mere patients, much as Plato might have wished. Moreover, as we shall see in the next 
section, while medicalization can help to drive political change, it can also entrench the status 
quo and help to shield those in power from public accountability. 
 
Medicalization and political change 
We often talk about medicine as though it were the apolitical sphere par excellence, free from 
the debate, disagreement and compromise, as well as perhaps the selfishness and incivility, that 
define our politics. The reality is more complicated. Many of the characteristics of the political 
sphere, we find in some form within the medical sphere, particularly when it comes to defining 
the domain of medicine, that is, the phenomena that are properly subject to medical expertise 
and treatment.  
The transformation of an issue into a medical problem involves political action in the 
Arendtian sense of the word, that is, people acting in concert to shape an issue of public 
concern.11 For instance, medical experts regularly come together to debate and determine 
which diseases and symptoms to include or exclude official handbooks of the healthcare 
professions – such as the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases. The designation of 
something as a disease may determine whether you are entitled to or denied healthcare, and 
whether the people around you take your complaints seriously or dismiss you as a moaner. It 
also influences national and local government funding for healthcare and welfare services, as 
well as other spheres, such as law and business. 
The designation of the coronavirus outbreak as a ‘pandemic’ also involved political 
action. Contrary to occasional assertions in the media, there were no predetermined criteria that 
would trigger this designation automatically; in fact, these were apparently abandoned years 
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ago.12 The decision to designate the outbreak a pandemic was still based on some medical 
criteria, such as global infection rates.13 What is notable however is that the WHO also 
considered a range of other factors as well, including people’s emotional reactions. ‘Using the 
word pandemic now does not fit the facts but it may certainly cause fear’, the WHO director 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in February.14 A few weeks later, he repeated this concern 
in a speech revealing his organization’s decision to finally designate the outbreak a pandemic: 
“Pandemic is not a word to use lightly or carelessly. It is a word that, if misused, can cause 
unreasonable fear, or unjustified acceptance that the fight is over, leading to unnecessary 
suffering and death”.15 This was a decision made by a collective of experts and administrators. 
The intended effect of the designation was not to release any additional resources. Rather, its 
intended impact was explicitly political.  They wanted governments to act.16  
As both Tedros’s words and the impact of the WHO’s action underline, the power of 
medicalization rests not only its capacity to mobilize institutional resources, but, crucially, also 
in its ability to imbue choices and people with authority. Significantly, this is an authority that, 
regardless of the internal political actions that may underpin it, appears to be beyond politics, 
because it is rooted in or related to medical knowledge. By virtue of this authority, many 
liberal-democratic governments have been pressured into taking actions that have flouted or 
challenged decades-old neoliberal dogma, such as fiscal austerity, the deconstruction of 
welfare institutions, and the primacy of the entrepreneurial individual, by passing vast spending 
packages to guarantee jobs and wages, reaffirming commitments to public healthcare, and 
emphasizing the importance of collective action in mitigating the crisis. It has also permitted 
medical experts, quite rightly, to exercise great influence over political decision-making as well 
as public discourse and actions. 
Yet this deep incursion, or perhaps blending, of the medical into the political has also 
provided people in power with opportunities to depoliticize their own actions, by creating the 
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appearance that they are themselves simply enacting medical advice. For example, since the 
crisis began members of the UK government have repeatedly stated that they are acting on 
medical expertise. At daily briefings, Prime Minister Boris Johnson – and during his illness 
and convalescence the deputy prime minister – often spoke with the government’s lead expert 
clearly visible behind him. The political scientist Matthew Flinders calls this tactic ‘hugging 
the experts’, which politicians use to deflect blame from themselves onto expert 
organizations.17 Some experts have become aware of this themselves. In late April, accusations 
emerged that Johnson’s special adviser Dominic Cummings and other political advisers had 
actively participated in and potentially influenced UK government’s Scientific Advisory Group 
for Emergencies (SAGE). Commenting on the scandal, an unnamed expert member of the 
group remarked: ‘I have been concerned sometimes that Sage has become too operational, so 
we’ve ended up looking as though we are making decisions. It contravenes previous guidelines 
about how you make sure you get impartial scientific advice going through to politicians, who 
make the decisions’.18  
Medicalization has not only distorted the decision-making process, but its conditions too. 
After all, it is the government that has appointed the Chief Scientific and Medical Advisers 
who lead SAGE and who in turn appoint the group’s members. This observation is not meant 
to cast doubt on the advice of SAGE. It is meant to highlight that the medicalization of policy 
making in the current crisis – which is driven not only by people in government but also by 
critics demanding more medically-informed decisions – is concealing the political decision-
making behind a multi-layered bulwark of expertise, behind which accountabilities may 
become difficult to discern. The blurring of political accountability is amplified by the types of 
emergency political decisions that are being considered or have already been made, ranging 
from giving police the power to enforce ill-defined social distancing laws to mandating 
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surveillance apps on people’s phones – all in the name of medicine. If, or how, privacy and 
other rights can withstand these medically reinforced challenges is an open question.19 
 
Medicalization and political emotions 
So far, I have focused on how the medicalization associated with the pandemic is influencing 
the way we talk and act politically. But what how we feel about politics? Although whether 
and how emotions should influence politics is still a matter of debate in some quarters, this 
summer’s Black Lives Matter protests are only the latest demonstration that emotions are key 
to fomenting and sustaining political action against injustice. But the Covid-19 crisis has raised 
another important issue, which has received less attention, namely, the emotions that 
medicalization can engender.  
Fear is probably the most frequently experienced and discussed emotion in the current 
crisis. It is also an emotion that is closely related to the medicalization of our own bodies and 
behaviors as well as those of others. A common philosophical distinction between fear – an 
emotion – and anxiety – a mood – is that the former has a specific object, whereas the latter is 
free-floating or, perhaps more accurately, all-encompassing.20 At times, everyone experiences 
a sense of anxiety related to our own vulnerability and the unpredictability of other people, 
which may lead us to be cautious about our actions and associates. When we perceive some 
thing or person as a direct threat, anxiety turns into fear of that thing or person. Many medical 
diseases are both objects and causes of fear to those who suffer from them.21 People who are 
ill may not only fear the disease they are suffering from, but also their own body and how it is 
affected by the disease. As Havi Carel points out, illness makes us aware of aspects of our 
existence that are otherwise simply part of the background noise of our day-to-day lives, such 
as our vulnerability, our ability to think and act, and our relationships to other people.22 Being 
ill can turn vaguely known facts and capacities – which may otherwise have been sources of 
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anxiety – into conscious experiences and objects of fear. As the current crisis demonstrates, 
people do not have to be sick themselves to experience this. Though most people are not ill, 
nearly everyone seems to have become aware of their vulnerability and come to fear a whole 
range of things, behaviors, and people, which were at most a source of anxiety before.  
It is not the experience of having Covid-19 nor the virus itself that has made social 
contact or certain ethnic minorities into objects of fear; it is medicalization. Experts, politicians, 
and medical organizations have designated touching and physical proximity to other people as 
potential sources of disease. In Europe and the US, racists and far-right politicians and media 
have labelled Asians as likely and culpable carriers of the virus. While the medical authority 
underpinning these respective examples differs radically, they are both instances in which a 
behavior, a body, or even an entire population has been brought into the conceptual scope of 
medicine, making them objects of fear.  
That the virus is being used to spread fear of people of Asian descent and fueling a 
surge in violence against them, demonstrates some of the worst potential consequences of 
medicalization. The fear engendered by medicalization need not have such destructive effects. 
Our fear of social contact is helping to contain the virus. We have also seen some apparent 
examples of fear’s capacity to create bonds of solidarity, prominently in the British context 
where hundreds of thousands of people volunteered to support the National Health Service.23 
Fear can be politically constructive as well. 
Whatever the consequences of this emotion, we are not experiencing fear ‘of the 
unknown’ as the World Health Organization and others have claimed, because it is not lack of 
medical knowledge that is making us afraid in the current crisis.24 ‘[W]e’ve all become amateur 
epidemiologists,” the journalist Charles Bethea recently observed.25 As this suggests, we have 
suddenly been equipped with and urged to use knowledge, the knowledge that things, 
behaviors, and people that were previously innocuous have become medical threats. If 
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anything, then, what we are experiencing is fear of the known, or, more specifically, fear of the 
medically known. 
We see similar patterns with other emotions in the pandemic, such as shame. Many of 
us have felt shame over our occasional failures to adhere to social distancing restrictions, 
because medical experts have told us that such failure put others at risk. When others flout 
these restrictions, we might get angry and perhaps seek to shame them. While such emotions 
have likely also helped to slow the spread of the virus, they can also have more pernicious 
effects. Some people might have experienced shame because others have labelled them with 
terms like ‘super-spreader’ or ‘Covid suspect’, terms which spread like wildfire in the media 
in the first few months of the outbreak. The WHO warned against the use of these terms, partly 
because the people targeted by them may feel too ashamed to seek medical care. Yet we should 
not forget that these concepts came into popular use through the efforts of medical experts. We 
are using them because our language has become medicalized; we have learned to talk the way 
experts do – or at least the way we think they do. Again, claiming that negative emotions like 
these are rooted in lack of knowledge is therefore misleading, particularly in this instance, since 
it obscures the link between emotions and medical knowledge. Failing to see this link means 
that we may also fail to understand the kind of citizens that might emerge from this crisis, 
namely, citizens deeply committed to medical expertise and rationality, possibly to the 
exclusion of democratic values and processes.  
 
Medicalization and democratic citizenship 
Another prevalent experience during the pandemic has been powerlessness. The character and 
magnitude of the crisis are of course among the factors that fuel this feeling, but so are the 
various aspects of medicalization explored in the previous sections. Conceptualizing an issue 
as a medical problem may entail giving up control, both by recognizing that one is powerless 
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in the face of the issue and by giving power to a medical expert to deal with it.26 Similar 
concerns have of course been raised about neoliberalism, and the aforementioned critics have 
long seen the two as linked. But, likely due to the influence of Foucault, medicalization is often 
treated as a mere extension of the neoliberalism.27 That may be why the specific ramifications 
of medicalization for democratic citizenship have not been adequately addressed, especially 
among political theorists. 
 The failure to address medicalization is particularly striking in Wendy Brown’s 
Undoing the Demos, in which she exposes how neoliberalism undermines or destroys the 
conditions for substantive, participatory democracy. Brown defines neoliberalism as an ‘order 
of normative reason’ within which all aspects of human life are understood as economic 
markets and humans themselves are conceived as entrepreneurs who seek to maximize their 
own value in these markets.28 This produces a subject that ‘approaches everything as a market 
and knows only market conduct’ and ‘cannot think public purposes or common problems’.29 
Following Foucault, Brown calls this subject homo oeconomicus. She warns that, as neoliberal 
reason spreads and becomes ascendant, the homo oeconomicus replaces the ‘already anemic’ 
homo politicus, which rules with others through deliberation, collaboration, and contest.30 Yet 
this picture is incomplete. 
An analysis of the medical and more specifically of medicalization may both complement 
and complicate such stories of democratic decay. Though medical rationality can and often 
does overlap with economic rationality, they are not coextensive.31 As the coronavirus crisis 
has shown, they can be diametrically opposed. This is partly because the end of maintaining 
health is, obviously, not always compatible with the end of building wealth. Another but related 
cause of opposition is that these respective rationalities derive their authority from different 
sources. Consider the radically differing levels of public trust in professions focused on health 
on the one hand and wealth on the other. According to the 2019 Ipsos Global Trust Worthiness 
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Index, doctors are the most trusted profession in the UK, and trust levels for doctors were more 
than four times higher than those for business leaders or bankers. Among US respondents, the 
gap was smaller, but trust in doctors still led the latter professions by a factor of three.32 I am 
not suggesting that these surveys reflect the actual political authority of medical experts and 
rationality on the one hand and their economic counterparts on the other. However, it does 
suggest that the nature of their authority differs. To borrow another Arendtian concept, their 
respective authority flows from different webs of relationships.33 Whereas medical rationality 
is bound up in, for example, hospitals, medical research, medications, doctor-patient 
relationships, and, crucially, health; economic rationality is bound up in, for example, financial 
data, money, shareholders and employees, and, crucially, wealth. 
Given the difference between economic and medical rationality, it is useful to consider 
alongside homo politicus and homo economicus a third subject archetype, namely, homo 
medicus. Although this term is ordinarily taken to refer to the doctor – this is how Foucault 
himself used it34 – it has more recently been used to name a subject driven by the imperative 
of health and that, hence, approaches everything in terms of maximizing health and minimizing 
risks to it.35 In a way, as Bethea suggests above, we have in this crisis all become homo 
medicus, actively evaluating the people and things around us in medical terms and questions, 
such as: Are the people in front of me contagious? Will my children become sick if I send them 
to school? Should I wear a mask? 
Unlike Brown’s homo economicus, however, homo medicus is clearly capable of 
‘thinking public purposes’, as the example British citizens and denizens rallying around the 
National Health Service in the crisis highlights. After the UK government issued a call for 
volunteers to support an NHS overburdened because of the pandemic, more than 750,000 
people responded.36 This is evidently not an instance of revolutionary political action; it is a 
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type of preservative political action, one that seeks to preserve a collective resource. Still, the 
actors involved are thinking a public purpose, even if this purpose is in a sense also medical.  
While the current level of mobilization around the NHS may be unprecedented, the 
service has long constituted a site of political contestation. Even people traditionally seen as 
lacking political agency have through the NHS found issues and spaces to organize around 
collectively. Resource deprived communities have rallied around local NHS surgeries 
threatened by closure and individuals diagnosed with mental disorder have demanded 
healthcare reforms in hospital boardrooms. The NHS and its constituent parts amount to what 
Bonnie Honig calls ‘public things’, things which have the power to gather people together and 
constitute them as citizens, and which are in turn contested, maintained, and secured through 
the concerted actions of citizens.37 Perhaps this epidemic demonstrates that homo medicus must 
think publicly, because health requires it.38 
But homo medicus raises democratic concerns too. Because of its overriding commitment 
to maintaining health, homo medicus may place too much trust in medical experts, especially 
in their capacity to develop and execute solutions to public issues. In this regard, this subject 
might find some common ground with homo economicus. For while homo medicus may at 
times need to defend politically the public things that enable health, she too seems to desire 
freedom from politics. We see this in the stream of polemical editorials accusing political 
leaders of not listening to the experts or of not giving them sufficient power, as though simply 
allowing medicine or science to rule would cure our ills – something which was a common 
refrain in some quarters before the crisis as well. The frequency and ferocity of such calls is 
surprising given that coronavirus crisis has made patent that speaking ‘medicine’ or ‘science’ 
as monoliths with specific solutions to any problem is a fantasy, and that, just as in softer fields, 
reasonable disagreements are both possible and common, particularly when it comes to policy. 
Hence, while exploring the relationship between the medical and the political might inform 
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more nuanced stories of democratic decay, they may also help us better understand the factors 
that may be undermining democracy and how we can counteract them. 
In homo medicus, we thus find two tendencies, one political and the other antipolitical. 
The post-pandemic world will be shaped by which of these tendencies gains the upper hand. If 
we can avail ourselves of the possibilities and resources established by the pandemic, the 
political tendency might win. The current wave of Black Lives Matter protests could be seen 
as a realization of this potential; while fueled partly by the disproportionate suffering that the 
pandemic inflicted on black and minority ethnic communities, the movement and its aims far 
exceed the medical frame.39 However, if we instead fall back on blind commitments to health 
and medicine, the antipolitical tendency of homo medicus is likely to prevail. We have seen 
evidence of what this may look like too. In response to the expanding the power of medical 
during the pandemic, right-wing populists are fomenting suspicion and hostility towards 
medical experts. Many on the left have in turn responded by affirming health as the only 
relevant value in considering how to move forward. Far from leading us towards an epistocratic 
utopia then, the antipolitics of homo medicus is likely to take us down a path of growing 
polarization.40  
Medical expertise will undoubtedly remain politically indispensable over the next few 
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